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Scientists carefully study how our brain processes information, though judges rarelyconsider these studies. But this research has great potential significance to judges,who spend much of their time making decisions of great importance to others.
Although the study of how the brain processes information is an evolving one, the infor-
mation now available can help judges to make better decisions.
Much of the processing for simple tasks—called reflexive processing—occurs in the
background, while most of us solve riddles or math problems through reflective process-
ing, which is deliberate and conscious. The reflective system has a limited capacity, so we
operate on a principle of least effort, tending to rely on the reflexive system when possi-
ble. To do so, we often use what scientists call schemas, in which characteristics of objects,
people, or behaviors coalesce into an easily recognizable pattern (like our ability to tell that
a red octagon in the distance is a stop sign).
Heuristics are schemas that are based on only part of the information available—letting
us make decisions more quickly. But heuristics can be faulty in a variety of ways. And since
heuristics (like all schemas) operate in the world of unconscious, reflexive processing, we
can easily make errors without recognizing the source of a faulty decision. Anchoring is one
of these heuristics: for example, a person is likely to give a higher or lower estimate of dam-
ages if a particularly high (or low) figure is introduced early in the process. That number—
even if far off the mark—tends to act as an anchor around which later estimates are formed. 
Implicit biases, another type of schema, also threaten fair processes and just outcomes.
They are based on implicit attitudes or stereotypes that operate below the radar, and judges
have been shown susceptible to them as well.
But most behaviors and decisions result from a combination of both reflexive and reflec-
tive processes, so there are ways to lessen the effects of faulty heuristics and implicit biases.
One step is to understand some of the causes of diminished decision-making abilities,
which include fatigue (like sleep deprivation), other depleted resources (like glucose lev-
els), mood, fluency (i.e., ease of processing information), and multitasking. Fatigue,
diminished resources, and multitasking all diminish performance.  Fluent, easy-to-under-
stand information will seem more accurate than more dense, hard-to-understand informa-
tion, but that isn’t necessarily the case. And mood affects the way we process information,
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with those in a positive mood generally more likely to engage in reflexive, automatic pro-
cessing and those in a negative mood more likely to engage in more reflective, deliberative
processing.
Several techniques can help judges to be more mindful and aware of the decision-mak-
ing process so that they make better decisions. First, focus on the higher purpose of the pro-
ceeding—hearing and properly deciding a case with a real impact on someone, not just pro-
cessing a court docket. Second, formalize and critique heuristics used to make repetitive but
important decisions. For example, a judge might consider what factors are leading to bail
decisions or probation conditions: Are they based on accurate information? Third, be mind-
ful and periodically “read the dials.” Are you tired? Is noise in the hallway a distraction? Is
a break in order? Taking a break or engaging in even brief meditation can restore awareness
and reduce stress. Fourth, decision aids, like checklists, can help. Doctors and pilots have
shown that even well-trained professionals can improve performance by following check-
lists. Fifth, seek feedback and foster accountability. Judges often operate in isolation and
without feedback. Competitive athletes improve performance through constant coaching
and feedback, and judges can improve performance by getting objective feedback too.
This paper builds upon our 2007 American Judges Association white paper on proce-
dural fairness. Litigant satisfaction is dependent upon judicial adherence to the four com-
ponents of procedural fairness: voice (allowing litigants to be heard), neutrality (making
decisions based on neutral, transparent principles), respectful treatment, and trust (the
perception that the judge is sincere and caring). Focusing on procedural fairness can help
a judge to be more mindful and focused on accurate decision making. For example, a
judge may feel that he or she has heard a similar case before, but the judge focused on pro-
cedural fairness will try to listen carefully to the case now at hand. To show that the judge
has heard what the litigants have said, the judge will repeat key themes from the parties’
testimony or argument. By doing so, the judge has the opportunity to see how this case
may differ from others he or she has heard before. And the mindful judge will be careful
to consider that possibility.
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Footnotes
1. See, e.g., Brandon L. Bartels, Top-Down and Bottom-Up Models of
Judicial Reasoning, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAK-
ING 41 (David E. Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010).
2. Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient
in Public Satisfaction, 44 CT. REV. 4 (2007); see Tom R. Tyler, Pro-
cedural Justice and the Court, 44 CT. REV. 26, 30-31 (2007) (pro-
viding the key procedural-justice principles contained in the side-
bar).
3. See Steve Leben, Considering Procedural-Fairness Concepts in the
Courts of Utah, at 4-6, paper presented at the Utah state judicial
conference, Sept. 14, 2011, available at http://www.procedural
fairness.org/Resources/~/media/Microsites/Files/procedural-
fairness/Utah%20Courts%20and%20Procedural%20Fair-
ness%2009-2011.ashx.
4. In a 2007 survey, respondents were asked, “[T]o what extent do
you think a state judge’s ruling is influenced by his or her politi-
cal views—to a great extent, moderate extent, small extent, or not
at all?” Thirty percent said to a great extent, and forty-five percent
said to a moderate extent. The survey had 1,514 respondents and
a reported margin of error of 3%. 2007 Annenberg Public Policy
Center Judicial Survey, available at http://www.annenbergpub
licpolicycenter.org/Downloads/20071017_JudicialSurvey/Sur-
vey_Questions_10-17-2007.pdf.  
5. In a 2006 survey, respondents were asked “[T]o what extent do
you think a desire to be promoted to the next higher court would
affect a judge’s ability to be fair and impartial when deciding a
case—to a great extent, moderate extent, small extent, or not at
all?” Thirty-five percent of respondents said to a great extent, and
forty percent said to a moderate extent. The survey had 1,002
respondents and a reported margin of error of 3%. Annenberg
Public Policy Center Judicial Independence Survey, available at
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/NewsFilter.aspx?my
SubType=PressRelease&.  
The fundamental role of judges is to ensure a fair process and a just outcome for eachcase they hear. Although much has been written about how judges go about theirdecision-making process, for most judges that literature is not on their reading list
or a part of their judicial education. Speculation about whether judges use a more induc-
tive, bottom-up approach to review information and arrive at a decision or a more deduc-
tive, top-down approach that starts with a decision and finds the information to support
it has interested many social scientists, but only a few judges.1 The press of heavy case-
loads or shrinking budgets seems far more imperative for judges to focus on. But a sig-
nificant and growing body of research from the fields of cognitive psychology and neuro-
science provides important insights about the decision-making process. How information
is processed can affect fair processes and just outcomes. Judges who aspire to be great—
not just good—at their profession need to focus on how to become better at making good
decisions.
This white paper reviews research about decision making and discusses its implications
for helping judges ensure fair processes and just outcomes. The paper builds on the 2007
American Judges Association (AJA) white paper, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in
Public Satisfaction, that encouraged judges to incorporate the principles of procedural
fairness (see sidebar), or procedural justice, to help ensure a decision-making process
deemed fair by litigants.2 Procedural fairness increases compliance with court orders and
is critical to positive public perceptions of the court system.3 But for a variety of reasons,
the legitimacy of judicial decisions is under attack. People believe, for example, that to a
moderate or significant extent, judges make decisions based upon their personal or polit-
ical beliefs rather than the rule of law.4 Nearly the same percentage of people believe
judges make decisions to a moderate or significant extent based on their desire to be
appointed to a higher court.5 The times dictate that judges become even more committed
to procedural fairness, and a better understanding of how to improve the decision-mak-
ing process is imperative to achieving that goal. Moreover, judges must provide both a
process recognized for its fairness and good, fair decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
6. Matthew D. Lieberman, Reflective and Reflexive Judgment Processes:
A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Approach, in SOCIAL JUDGMENTS:
IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT PROCESSES 44 (Joseph P. Forgas, Kipling D.
Williams, & William Von Hippel eds., 2003). Scientists are still
exploring whether there are, in fact, two different systems, multi-
ple systems, or multiple processes that make up one system, but
most agree on “processes that are unconscious, rapid, automatic,
and high capacity, and those that are conscious, slow, and deliber-
ative.” Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Dual-Processing Accounts of Rea-
soning, Judgment, and Social Cognition, 255 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 255,
256 (2008). The white paper relies on Lieberman’s model because
of his extensive work mapping areas of the brain in which each
system predominates and because the labels he uses are more
descriptive of decision-making processes than, for example, Daniel
Kahneman’s system 1 and system 2 labels. Compare Burke &
Leben, supra note 2, and Lieberman, supra, with DANIEL KAHNEMAN,
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
Being a great judge all of the time is not easy. Judges are mortals
with all of the accompanying frailties. Implementing procedural-
justice principles in the courtroom demands the judge’s “mindful”
or conscious focus and attention but also demands good decision-
making practices in general. Understanding how the brain
processes information and the various factors that can influence
decisions and courtroom behaviors is a first step to practicing more
mindful decision making. 
There is a compelling body of knowledge accumulated by social
and cognitive science on information processing and decision mak-
ing. More recently, advances in neuroscience have helped scientists
further expand their understanding of how the brain processes information. Although
this continues to be a robust area of inquiry, there is much that scientists do not yet know.
Thus this white paper is a snapshot in time, offered with the understanding that advances
in technology and neuroscience promise continued refinement of current knowledge and
its implications for the decision-making process. This paper offers a summary of some of
the key findings applicable to judicial decision making and provides references for those
readers interested in learning more. 
At any point in time, an individual is bombarded with a host of sensory informa-tion. Most of this information is processed “behind the scenes” with little or noknowledge on the part of the individual. Much like a computer continues to work
in the background while a word-processing program is on the screen, individuals also
constantly process a barrage of sights (e.g., the glare on the screen), sounds (e.g., the click
of the keys), smells (e.g., the coffee on the desk), and other information—sorting, cate-
gorizing, and storing it—even as the individuals intently focus on a specific task (e.g.,
reading a case file or writing an opinion). 
This dual system of information processing is the mechanism through which judg-
ments and decisions are made. Neuroscientist Matthew Lieberman refers to the auto-
matic, rapid, unconscious system that operates in the background as reflexive, and the
deliberative, slow, and conscious system as reflective. Through neuroimaging, he has
identified different areas of the brain associated with each system.6
The reflexive, automatic system relies on patterns that develop based on the individ-
THE SCIENCE OF DECISION MAKING
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Key Procedural-Justice Principles:
• Voice—Litigants have the opportu-
nity to participate in the process and
offer their perspective. 
• Neutrality—Litigants believe the
judge is neutral, makes decisions
based on rules rather than opinions,
and applies rules consistently.
• Respectful treatment—Litigants
are treated with dignity and feel their
problems are taken seriously.
• Trust—Litigants perceive the judge is
sincere and caring.
Tyler, infra note 2
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ual’s experiences with the world. The individual learns over time
how to distinguish different objects, people, actions, and situations
based on features that coalesce into patterns. These patterns,
referred to as schemas, help the brain process information quickly
and efficiently. Based on prior experiences, for example, individuals
know that a red octagon means stop and an outstretched hand is a
greeting. 
The reflective, controlled system relies on intention and effort to perform a task. Mem-
orizing a new phone number or computer password requires concentration. Once the
phone number is repeatedly practiced, however, it becomes a readily accessible schema
that comes to mind with little effort. For a judge with a domestic-violence docket, for
example, a bit of study up-front would teach the judge the elements of domestic battery—
with no need to look it up again as each case is called.
While the reflexive system can process information on an ongoing basis, the reflective
system has a limited capacity. It works for a while but eventually runs out of gas. Thus
the brain is somewhat miserly about its use of the reflective system. This “principle of
least effort” means that decision makers initially tend to rely on the automatic retrieval of
schemas to process incoming information and engage the reflective system only when
motivated to do otherwise by, for example, learning a new skill or solving a complex
problem.7
Gary Klein refers to this reliance on schemas as recognition-primed decision making.8
Klein’s premise is that experts develop schemas, based on their experience, that they sub-
sequently use to size up a situation and decide how to move forward.
Thus a firefighter does not enter a burning building and proceed to
analyze all the potential options for action. Rather, the firefighter
instantaneously takes in a variety of information about the current
situation and matches it to a response option that has worked in sim-
ilar situations. The initial option (i.e., decision) may not have been
the best option if there had been enough time to generate and analyze all possible options,
but it usually works. In this sense, Klein says his model relies on what Herbert Simon
referred to as “satisficing”—finding the first option that works rather than the most opti-
mal option.9 Judges, particularly when confronted with large dockets, heavy calendars, or
pressing “emergency” motions, can tend to use the same process as the firefighter. Some-
times using the first option that works rather than the optimal option actually might be
okay—but not always.
Schema-based, reflexive decision making works for countless choices an individual
makes throughout the day.10 And in some instances, such as those requiring a quick deci-
7. Serena Chen & Shelly Chaiken, The Heuristic-Systematic Model in
Its Broader Context, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
OGY 73 (Shelley Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999).
8. Gary A. Klein, A Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) Model of Rapid
Decision Making, in DECISION MAKING IN ACTION: MODELS AND
METHODS 138 (Gary A. Klein, Judith Orasanu, Roberta Calder-
wood, & Caroline E. Zsambok eds., 1993).
9. Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environ-
ment, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 129 (1956).
10. “Most of the time we solve problems without coming close to the
conscious, step-by-step analysis of the deliberative approach. In
fact, attempting to approach even a small fraction of the problems
we encounter in a full, deliberative manner would bring our activ-
ities to a screeching halt. Out of necessity, most of problem-solv-
ing is intuitive.” PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM
SOLVING, DECISION MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE
FOR LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 14 (2010). 
Reflexive processes—Like blinking
in bright sunlight, these reflexive
processes are automatic, rapid, and
unconscious.
Reflective processes—Like solving
a math problem, reflective processes
are deliberative, slow, and conscious.
Schemas—Characteristics of objects,
people, and behaviors that, based on
an individual’s experiences, coalesce
into patterns (e.g., a red octagon
means stop). 
11. See, e.g., Timothy D. Wilson et al., Introspecting About Reasons Can
Reduce Post-Choice Satisfaction, 19 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 331 (1993); Timothy D. Wilson & Jonathan W. Schooler,
Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality of Prefer-
ences and Decisions, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181
(1991).
12. See Desmond Morris, Gestures, Meanings, and Cultures, YOUTUBE
(Jan. 29, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fRQSRed
58XM, for some common examples of cultural differences in
interpreting gestures in a video by Desmond Morris.
13. Gerd Gigerenzer & Wolfgang Gaissmaier, Heuristic Decision Mak-
ing, 62 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 451 (2011).
14. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6.
15. Id.; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncer-
tainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974).
16. Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler, & Fritz Strack, Playing Dice
with Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on
Experts’ Judicial Decision Making, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 188 (2006).
sion in an emergency situation, as in the firefighter example, or a judgment involving an
individual preference, like selecting the best tasting jam, the reflexive approach might be
better than a more deliberative, reflective approach.11 The problem with reflexive deci-
sion making, however, is that sometimes the underlying schemas are based on inaccurate
information (e.g., assuming two events that occur together are related, as in supersti-
tions), are only partially correct (e.g., stereotypes), or are applied incorrectly (e.g., using
a gesture that is misinterpreted in another country).12 Two prominent examples of
schemas that can lead to inaccurate decisions are cognitive heuristics and implicit biases,
described in the next sections.
COGNITIVE HEURISTICS
Heuristics are schemas individuals use to solve problems and make
decisions quickly. They work rapidly by attending to only some of
the information available. A judge relying on only some of the infor-
mation available to make a decision that needs to be made quickly
is not necessarily bad. Research shows that reliance on heuristics in
some circumstances can lead to more accurate decisions and judgments than reliance on
more rational models.13 However, research also shows how heuristics can lead decision
makers to jump to conclusions and make errors in solving problems.14 Surely every expe-
rienced judge has at one point jumped to a conclusion that ultimately proved to be
wrong.
The anchoring heuristic predicts that an individual’s estimates or comparison judg-
ments are influenced by an initial value—even if the value is selected at random and has
no connection to the task at hand. A low initial value elicits estimates lower than a high
initial value. In a classic study demonstrating anchoring, participants watched as a
researcher spun a wheel of fortune, wrote down the number observed, and then estimated
the number of African countries in the United Nations.15 The wheel of fortune was rigged
to stop only on the numbers 10 and 65. The median response of participants who wrote
down 10 was 25 countries; the median response for participants who wrote down 65 was
45 countries. Thus the initial random value anchored participants’ subsequent estimates
of the number of countries. 
How applicable is this research to the courtroom? Do judges who have been specifi-
cally trained to follow procedural rules designed to minimize the influence of irrelevant
information succumb to anchoring in the same way as the study participants estimating
the number of African countries in the United Nations? Birte Englich and her colleagues
explored this question and discovered the answer is yes.16 In a series of studies with Ger-
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Heuristics—schemas that rely on only
some of the information available so
an individual can make a decision
quickly and with little effort.
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man judges, they examined whether a criminal sentencing decision
could be influenced by irrelevant anchors that judges knew to be
irrelevant. In the studies, the irrelevant anchor was presented by (a)
a journalist’s question about the sentence, (b) a prosecutor’s
acknowledged, randomly determined sentencing demand, and (c) a
prosecutor’s sentencing demand obtained by the judge throwing a
pair of loaded dice. In all cases the judges’ decisions were influenced by the anchor. The
judges sentenced more harshly when exposed to the higher rather than lower randomly
determined anchor. A fourth study by the researchers also demonstrated that judges
exposed to a high anchor responded to incriminating evidence faster than exculpatory
evidence (measured by response latencies on a timed categorization test), suggesting that
the anchor primed the judges to look for anchor-consistent information.17 In addition,
the criminal-law judges were more certain about their decisions than those who were not
experts in criminal law, suggesting that “experts may mistakenly see themselves as less
susceptible to biasing influences on their sentencing decisions.”18
Another heuristic is the reliance on small samples as indicative of the larger popula-
tion. A set of ten coin tosses, for example, might yield ten heads in a row and thus not be
representative of the larger population of tosses across many small samples that would
yield an even distribution of heads and tails. Nonetheless, individuals frequently view
small samples as representative and adjust their expectations accordingly. Many individ-
uals fall prey to the gambler’s fallacy, erroneously believing, for example, that “black” is
due after a run of “red” on the roulette wheel.19
Uri Simonsohn and Francesca Gino explored the influence of this heuristic on profes-
sionals who make a set of decisions every day.20 They postulated that professionals would
try to align each daily set of decisions to reflect their overall distribution of decisions. To
test this hypothesis, the researchers reviewed data from over 9,000 MBA interviews and
found that interviewers’ daily subsets of scores tended to reflect their overall distribution
of scores. That is, the interviewers took into consideration their previous scores for the
day in formulating their subsequent scores, and the effect was stronger as the day pro-
gressed. Thus even though four interviewees on a given day may all be highly desirable,
interviewers will be reluctant to score all highly, and the interviewees at the end of the
day will be more likely to be ranked lower. The researchers consider what this might
mean for judicial decisions:
Imagine, for example, a judge who must make dozens of judgments a
day. Given that people underestimate the presence of streaks in random
sequences, the judge may be disproportionately reluctant to evaluate 4, 5,
or 6 people in a row in too similar a fashion, even though that “subset” was
formed post-hoc.21
17. The same was not true for exculpatory information. The
researchers found this consistent with prior research indicating
that negative information tends to be more salient for individuals
in general, and they hypothesized that judges focus on the incrim-
inating information because they are charged with determining
whether the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
18. Englich et al., supra note 16, at 194.
19. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 15.
20. Uri Simonshon & Francesca Gino, Daily Horizons: Evidence of
Narrow Bracketing in Judgment from 10 Years of MBA-Admission
Interviews, PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE (forthcoming).
21. Id. at 10-11 (citing Thomas Gilovich, Robert Vallone, & Amos
Tversky, The Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of Ran-
dom Sequences, 17 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 295 (1985)).
Research demonstrates that despite their
experience and knowledge, expert
judges are influenced by randomly
determined anchors.
Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 
infra note 16 at 198
22. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside
the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001).
23. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blink-
ing on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
21 (2007).
24. Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can
Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information?: The Difficulty of Deliber-
ately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005). 
25. Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and
Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5
(1989).
26. About Us, PROJECT IMPLICIT, http://www.projectimplicit.net/
about.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
Further evidence that judges are susceptible to heuristics comes from a series of stud-
ies by law professors Chris Guthrie and Jeffrey Rachlinski and Judge Andrew Wistrich.22
They explored judges’ use of five different heuristics: (a) anchoring, (b) framing—the
same information presented differently (e.g., the glass is half full or half empty) affects
interpretation of gains and losses, (c) hindsight—the sense that specific outcomes were
more predictable once the outcomes are known (e.g., “Monday-morning quarterback-
ing”), (d) representativeness—ignoring statistical base-rate information, and (e) egocen-
tricity—overconfidence in one’s abilities. They found that judges’ decisions were influ-
enced by each of the heuristics. For example, in a test in which some judges were told
about a clearly meritless motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in a diversity case
(based on the idea that damages were less than $75,000), judges who were aware that
such a motion had been filed awarded a lesser damage amount (30% less overall) than
judges who didn’t know about the motion to dismiss.23 But they also found that judges
showed less susceptibility to the framing and representativeness heuristics than other
experts and laypersons, and, in a subsequent study, found that hindsight did not affect
judges’ decisions in a specific scenario involving a probable-cause determination.24
The findings of a myriad of scientists are that people—judges assuredly included—are
susceptible to heuristics. But we may be able to overcome them. The ability to overcome
heuristics starts with understanding the concept, understanding yourself, and being
inquisitive enough to frequently ask questions—of yourself.
IMPLICIT BIASES
Implicit biases offer another example of how schemas can threaten fair processes and
just outcomes. Implicit biases are based on implicit attitudes or stereotypes that operate
below the radar. As a result, individuals are not aware that implicit biases may be affect-
ing their behaviors and decisions. Indeed, research shows that even individuals who con-
sciously strive to be fair and objective can nonetheless be influenced by implicit biases.25
Scientists use a variety of methods to measure implicit bias, but the most common is
reaction time. Reaction-time measures are based on the reflexive system’s pairing of two
stimuli that are strongly associated (e.g., elderly and frail) more quickly than two stimuli
that are less strongly associated (e.g., elderly and robust). Project Implicit, begun in 1998
by researchers from Harvard University, the University of Virginia, and the University of
Washington, offers web-based reaction-time tests, referred to as Implicit Association
Tests, in over fifteen areas such as weight, age, race, and religion that anyone can take.26
A review of the results of over 2.5 million Implicit Association Tests taken on various
Project Implicit demonstration sites between 2000 and 2006 revealed the pervasiveness of
implicit preferences for socially privileged groups such as white over black and straight
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over gay.27 Research also shows that implicit biases can influence decisions in a variety of
real-life settings such as employers hiring job applicants, police officers deciding to shoot,
healthcare workers providing medical treatment, and voters making voting choices.28
Are judges influenced by implicit biases—despite their training and conscious efforts
to be fair and objective? Of course one would hope not, but perhaps the safest answer is
to concede there is that potential. Research by Rachlinski, Wistrich, and Guthrie, joined
by Sheri Lynn Johnson, suggests that judges actually may be influenced by implicit bias.29
The researchers found, for example, a strong white preference on the Implicit Association
Test among white judges. In keeping with the general population findings of the Implicit
Association Test, the black judges showed no clear preference overall (44% showed a
white preference but the preference was weaker overall). The researchers also reported
some evidence that implicit bias affected judges’ sentencing decisions, though this find-
ing was less clear. Most importantly for this white paper, the researchers found that
“when judges are aware of a need to monitor their own responses for the influence of
implicit racial biases, and are motivated to suppress that bias, they appear able to do so.”30
Scientists generally agree that most behaviors and decisions result from a combina-tion of both reflexive and reflective processes. The question is the extent to and wayin which the two processes work together for any particular decision.31 Several
researchers postulate what psychologist Jonathan Evans refers to as “default-interven-
tionist” models of judgment and decision making.32 These models propose that initial
intuitive or reflexive responses are generated, which are then modified or endorsed by the
reflective system. The reflective system routinely endorses the initial responses, reserving
more deliberative, effortful processing to when the individual is motivated to do so and
working memory and time are sufficient.33
In many arenas, default processing is good enough. But in the courtroom, where indi-
viduals face possible restrictions of liberty and we consider other life-altering issues—
such as family preservation, personal safety, economic security, and adequate housing—
fair processes and just outcomes demand a more deliberate approach. Procedural-fairness
principles that call for giving litigants voice, ensuring neutrality, demonstrating respect
and dignity for the litigant, and presenting a trustworthy character all require an actively
engaged decision maker. 
84 Court Review - Volume 49 
MINDFUL JUDICIAL DECISIONS
31. Robert Boyd et al., Explicit and Implicit Strategies in Decision Mak-
ing, in BETTER THAN CONSCIOUS? DECISION MAKING, THE HUMAN
MIND, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONS 225 (Christoph Engel &
Wolf Singer eds., 2008); Roy F. Baumeister, E. J. Masicampo, &
Kathleen D. Vohs, Do Conscious Thoughts Cause Behavior? 62 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 331 (2011); Evans, supra note 6.
32. Evans, supra note 6, at 266. 
33. Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, The Heuristic-Analytic Theory of Reason-
ing: Extension and Evaluation, 13 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 378,
382 (2006).
34. Guthrie et al., supra note 23, at 33.
35. Yvonne Harrison, & James A. Horne, The Impact of Sleep Depriva-
tion on Decision Making: A Review, 6 J.  EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
APPLIED 236, 246 (2000).
Even so, deliberative decision making does not mean that judges always override their
initial intuitive reactions. As with firefighters, judges gain expertise over time that will
become part of their reflexive schemas for judging certain cases and will help them move
through their often unwieldy calendars. The problem is that judges, like everyone else,
also rely on faulty schemas (e.g., anchoring and implicit bias) in some circumstances and
thus need to check their thinking for these schemas as well. Guthrie and his colleagues
call this approach the “intuitive-override” model of judging:
[W]e do not suggest that judges should reject intuition in all cases.
Rather, we suggest that judges should use deliberation as a verification
mechanism especially in those cases where intuition is apt to be unreliable
either because feedback is absent or because judges face cues likely to
induce misleading reliance on heuristics.34
Competitive athletes believe that training, adequate sleep, and proper diet are essential
for good performance. But being a judge is a pretty sedentary job, so it is understandable
that many, if not most judges do not view the requirements of good judicial performance
as a competitive athlete might. Even judges should consider how to prepare for the key
components of their work, just as an athlete would. Purposeful engagement of delibera-
tive processing is the essence of good judging—being more attentive and open to each
individual matter and ensuring that fair processes are guiding its outcome. Being atten-
tive and open, however, is not easy when a judge is facing a long docket, complex hear-
ings, particularly contentious parties, or all of the above. In addition, a number of emo-
tional, physical, cognitive, and social or cultural factors can interfere with a judge’s abil-
ity to be mindful. Examples of some of these follow.
FATIGUE
In their article published in 2000, researchers Yvonne Harrison and James Horne
reviewed studies on the effects of sleep deprivation and identified several areas of con-
cern, including “communication, lack of innovation, inflexibility of thought processes,
inappropriate attention to peripheral concerns or distraction, over-reliance on previous
strategies, unwillingness to try out novel strategies, unreliable memory for when events
occurred, change in mood including loss of empathy with colleagues, and inability to deal
with surprise and the unexpected.”35 Much of the research they reviewed was based on
deprivation of one or more nights’ sleep. 
A subsequent article published in 2003 by researchers from the University of Pennsyl-
vania, the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, and the Harvard Medical Center explored
whether reduced hours of sleep each night, rather than no sleep at all, might also affect
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performance.36 They found that individuals whose sleep was reduced to 6 hours or less
across a 14-day period produced problems in cognitive performance equal to individuals
who had experienced up to 2 full nights of sleep deprivation. The researchers also found
that individuals reported being only slightly sleepy at the end of the study, when their per-
formance was worst, suggesting that individuals are unreliable at assessing their lack of
sleep or that they do not experience tiredness despite poor performance. 
Talking about how much sleep a judge gets or suggesting that more sleep leads to bet-
ter judicial decisions may seem trite to some and downright preposterous to others. But
why not ask to what extent sleep deprivation does interfere with real-life decision mak-
ing? Dr. Christopher Landrigan and his colleagues investigated the effects of sleep depri-
vation on medical interns with longer shifts and discovered that they made 36% more
serious medical errors than their counterparts who did not have shifts of 24 hours or
more and worked 20 fewer hours per week.37 On a larger scale, the Association of Pro-
fessional Sleep Societies’ Committee on Catastrophes, Sleep, and Public Policy reviewed
several disasters such as the Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear plant incidents and
the Space Shuttle Challenger accident and concluded that “sleep and sleep-related factors
appear to be involved in widely disparate types of disasters.”38 The report reviewed
research demonstrating that the tendency to want to sleep is greatest in the early morn-
ing hours and, to a lesser extent, in the midafternoon; during the disasters, individuals
made critical judgment errors in the early morning hours. The Committee noted that dur-
ing the two “vulnerable” periods of the day, neural processes controlling alertness and
sleep lessen the capacity of an individual to function and that “inadequate sleep, even as
little as 1 or 2 [hours] less than usual sleep, can greatly exaggerate the tendency for error
during the time zones of vulnerability.”39
DEPLETED RESOURCES
Glucose fuels the brain, and research shows that reflective processes demand more fuel
than reflexive processes. When glucose levels are low, individuals have a tendency to rely
more on reflexive decision-making strategies and have more difficulty summoning their
reflective system to check their decisions.40 Glucose is also depleted when exercising self-
control: Controlling attention, regulating emotions, resisting impulsivity, and coping with
stress have all been found to consume relatively large amounts of glucose.41 Thus both deci-
sion making and exercising self-control require glucose, and both can also deplete glucose
stores. Research shows that making many decisions can subsequently interfere with an indi-
vidual’s ability to exercise self-control, and conversely, that exercising self-control can lead
to less likelihood of engaging the effortful, reflective system in making decisions.42
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This research may explain the findings of a recent study that examined decision fatigue
among Israeli judges.43 The study found that the experienced parole-board judges’ deci-
sions fluctuated based on when cases were heard during the day. Cases heard early in the
morning and just after breaks (with meals) were more likely to end with a parole grant
than cases heard shortly before breaks and at the end of the day. That is, decisions tended
to default to the status quo of denying parole as the number of cases increased until
judges took a break. Because each break included a meal, it is not possible to say with cer-
tainty that it was the meal and not the “timeout” that affected subsequent decisions. But
research in this area suggests that the meal replenished glucose stores and thus con-
tributed to the change in “default” processing in cases following a break. In either case,
the study does suggest that “judicial decisions can be influenced by whether the judge
took a break to eat.”44
MOOD
Mood affects how an individual processes information. In general, those in a positive
mood engage in more reflexive, automatic processing, and those in a negative mood
engage in more reflective, deliberative processing.45 One explanation is that positive
moods enhance the default processing approach—the status quo—and negative moods
inhibit it.46 In many instances, as has been described earlier, individuals “default” to
reflexive processing; thus positive moods often are associated with reflexive processing.
If things are good, there is little motivation to engage in more effortful processing.
Reliance on stereotypes comes easily.47 A negative mood, on the other hand, signals a
problem situation that needs more focus and attention to detail. 
Based on their review of the literature, researchers Kimberly Elsbach and Pamela Barr
suggest that different moods are more suited for some purposes than others: “[P]ositive
moods are best suited for decision-making tasks that are interesting or require creativity
or efficiency, while negative moods are best suited for decision tasks that are effortful
and/or require careful consideration and analysis of a number of different issues and
potential outcomes.”48 The researchers also cite studies finding that individuals in a good
mood tend to be overly optimistic and self-confident in their own abilities. 
This is not to suggest that judges purposely summon a negative mood before taking the
bench. Individuals can override their spontaneous reliance on reflexive processing when
in a positive mood by being more vigilant. Research shows, for example, that specifically
instructing individuals to pay attention and holding individuals accountable for their
decisions can induce more effortful processing.49
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FLUENCY
Fluency refers to the ease with which individuals process information. People gener-
ally consider information that is processed more fluently as more accurate and true than
less fluent information.50 This holds true for a range of sensory and cognitive informa-
tion. For example, information written in an easy-to-read type is considered more accu-
rate than the same information written in a more difficult-to-process font. Likewise,
information that is familiar, easier to pronounce, and easier to retrieve from memory is
judged more true and likeable and individuals express more confidence in it, whatever its
actual content (and accuracy) may be. Much of advertising is based on the idea of flu-
ency—repeatedly showing the same information in easily processed ways. 
Psychologist Adam Alter and his colleagues demonstrated that fluency is associated
with reflexive information processing and disfluency is associated with more reflective
processing.51 In one of their studies, they asked participants to complete the Cognitive
Reflection Test, a series of three questions that seem to have initially easy answers but,
upon further reflection, require more systematic processing to obtain the correct
responses. For example, one question reads:
A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the
ball. How much does the ball cost? _____ cents52
The automatic response is 10 cents, but more careful consideration of the problem
reveals the correct answer to be 5 cents: If the ball costs 10 cents and the bat is $1.00 more
than the ball (i.e., $1.10), the total cost would be $1.20 rather than $1.10.53
The researchers gave some of the participants in the study the questions in an easy-to-
read font and other participants received the questions in a difficult-to-read font. Those
in the latter, disfluency group answered more items correctly. The researchers suggested
that the difficult font served as a cue to the reflective system that the task would require
more effort to process. Those in the easy-font group had no cue that more effortful pro-
cessing was required.
In the courtroom, Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie have demonstrated the potential
effects of fluency. In general, their research found that when individuals read case mate-
rials and were asked to come to a decision at the end (similar to the typical juror’s task),
the individuals develop narrative stories to understand the evidence. The researchers
manipulated the order of the evidence provided, making it easier or harder to develop a
coherent narrative. Consistent with the research on fluency, they found that the ease in
creating a narrative story affected “perceptions of evidence strength, judgments about
confidence, and the impact of information about witness credibility.”54 Decisions shifted
in the direction of the narratives that were easier to construct. 
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The influence of fluency on information processing is complex and situation specific.
For example, at least in some situations, individuals will discount fluency when they are
aware that it could be influencing their judgments.55 Thus it is important for judges to
learn about and be aware of the potential effects of fluency on their decisions. The poten-
tial for error based on fluency provides one more reason for judges to check their reflex-
ive processing.
MULTITASKING
We live in a society where multitasking is too often the norm. Teenagers often multi-
task when driving and texting, with dangerous results. The same may be true for the
results of decisions made by multitasking judges. 
For the brain, multitasking is not performing two or more tasks
simultaneously; rather, multitasking involves the rapid switching
from one task to another. Done in milliseconds, the brain post-
pones one task and sets up for the next.56 For more than 97% of the
population, this task switching has a cost in performance.57 Despite
numerous studies to the contrary, however, most individuals think
they are good at multitasking and that they are more efficient as a
result. Many judges are the same: even if they concede that multi-
tasking has a cost, many judges are quite good at articulating that—
for them—the cost is negligible and worth it. 
But researchers consistently find diminished performance by those who multitask. For
example, psychologists Jason Watson and David Strayer tested the performance of 200
individuals on a driving simulation task, a cognitive task involving memorization and
basic math problems, and a dual-task condition involving both the driving simulation
and the cognitive tasks.58 Performance measures on the individual tasks were signifi-
cantly better than those in the dual-task condition. The researchers found that a very
small percentage of the participants (2.5%) did not see their performance degrade in the
dual-task condition. However, they noted that these individuals are the exception and
cautioned readers about assuming they are one of the “supertaskers”: 
Indeed, our studies over the last decade have found that a great many
people have the belief that the laws of attention do not apply to them (e.g.,
they have seen other drivers who are impaired while multitasking, but they
themselves are the exception to the rule). In fact, some readers may also be
wondering whether they too are supertaskers; however, we suggest that the
odds of this are against them.59
Other studies have shown that more multitasking does not necessarily improve multi-
tasking skills. For example, a study from Stanford University researchers demonstrated
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EXAMPLES OF MULTITASKING
WHILE ON THE BENCH
• Signing orders
• Reviewing documents and upcoming
cases
• Checking email or texts
• Surfing the Internet
• Talking with individuals not involved
in the present case
that individuals who commonly multitasked using different types of media had less atten-
tional control than light media multitaskers and were worse at task switching.60 High
media multitaskers had difficulty filtering out extraneous information and suppressing
task switching. Another study explored whether avid videogame players are better at mul-
titasking and found they, like nonvideogame players, performed worse during dual-task
conditions.61
Despite information that multitasking is less efficient, degrades performance, and may
be dangerous—Strayer and his colleagues found that the crash risk of using a “hands-
free” cell phone while driving is comparable to driving while intoxicated—individuals
still find it difficult not to multitask.62 Why? At least one reason is that it feels good. Ohio
State University researchers Zheng Wang and John Tchernev asked college students to
record their activities across 28 days and note why they were engaged in the activity and
what they experienced as a result.63 Though cognitive needs (e.g., gaining knowledge and
understanding) drove many media multitasking activities, the students did not report
that the activities satisfied those needs. Rather, the multitasking addressed emotional
needs (e.g., having a pleasurable experience). The researchers concluded that the emo-
tional gratification resulting from multitasking serves to reinforce more multitasking
behavior: “In this sense, the ‘myth’ of multitasking actually is partially caused by the ‘mis-
perception’ of the efficiency of multitasking and by positive feelings associated with the
behavior, which is emotionally satisfying but cognitively unproductive.”64
Task switching in the courtroom has the potential of distracting the judge and reduc-
ing performance, but it also carries with it the sense that the judge is not fully engaged
with the matter at hand. A central tenet of procedural fairness is that the judge is an active
listener. If the judge seems distracted with other matters, litigants will not feel that their
voice has been fully heard. A recent study by Harvard psychologists demonstrated the
importance of giving people voice.65 The researchers found that regions of the brain asso-
ciated with reward are activated when individuals are allowed to talk about themselves to
others. In an interview, Stanford multitasking researcher Clifford Nass also mused about
giving people attention: “[W]hen I grew up, the greatest gift you could give someone was
attention, and the best way to insult someone was to ignore them. . . . The greatest gift
was attention.” 66
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Almost everything a judge does involves processing information and making deci-sions. So if we are to improve our performance as judges, we must focus onimproving our performance of those tasks. 
Doing so can offer additional benefits as well. One aspect of being more mindful is
finding ways to relieve stress, which can interfere with information processing and deci-
sion making. Some judges may regard job stress as part of the job, but job stress also leads
to diminished physical health.67 Of course, consistent with our discussion in this paper,
stress also leads to a diminished capacity for good decision making.68
In the remainder of this paper, we suggest some strategies that may help judges be more
mindful and make better decisions:
• Focus on purpose. Sometimes the sheer press of business makes it difficult for a judge
to focus on the individual case. The primary purpose of court work becomes moving
cases as opposed to hearing them. Former Minnesota Chief Justice Kathleen Blatz, for
example, once compared the court’s work to a vegetable factory:
Instead of cans of peas, you’ve got cases. You just move ’em, move ’em,
move ’em. One of my colleagues on the bench said: “You know, I feel like
I work for McJustice: we sure aren’t good for you, but we are fast.”69
It is hard to be mindful when the focus is on getting through a docket, signing
orders, writing opinions, preparing a speech for a local community group, and any
number of other responsibilities that fall on a judge’s plate. The tendency is to focus on
the next task around the corner rather than the current one. Taking time—even just a
few minutes—to bring full attention to the matter at hand offers a check on reflexive,
automatic decision making and a step toward ensuring a fair process and a just out-
come. Administrative Judge Judy Harris Kluger makes this point in her story about
working in the busy New York City Criminal Court: 
You know, for a long time my claim to fame was that I arraigned 200
cases in one session. That’s ridiculous. When I was arraigning cases, I’d be
handed the papers, say the sentence is going to be five days, ten days,
whatever, never even looking at the defendant. At a community court, I’m
able to look up from the papers and see the person standing in front of me.
It takes two or three more minutes, but I think a judge is much more effec-
tive that way.70
In addition, judges who see their work not as the sum of the cases they move in a
particular day but as contributing to a fair and just court system are likely to find
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more satisfaction in their work. Research shows that individuals who perceive their
work as significant and serving a greater purpose are likely to experience greater lev-
els of meaningfulness.71 Judges who see themselves as cogs in the system may bene-
fit from remembering their contributions to the larger system goals. Efficiency and
timeliness are important, but not at the expense of reflective decision making and pro-
cedural fairness. 
• Formalize and critique decision heuristics. Although the law may assume that deci-
sion makers review and weigh all relevant information in a systematic manner to reach
an optimal judgment, research demonstrates that is not the case. In a study of bail deci-
sions in England and Wales, for example, researchers found that a simple “matching
heuristic” explained decisions better than a more complex, integrated model of deci-
sion making. The matching heuristic relied primarily on three factors: bail decisions
could be predicted 92% of the time in one court, for example, by relying on (a) whether
the prosecutor opposed bail, (b) whether a previous court imposed conditions or
remanded in custody, and (c) whether police imposed conditions or remanded in cus-
tody. If the answer was yes to any of these, the magistrate’s decision was to deny bail.72
In another study, the findings showed that magistrates’ beliefs about their decision-
making process differed from their practice (i.e., relying on a simple heuristic), as indi-
cated by the following comments: 
For example, a lay magistrate wrote to us stating that “the situation . . .
depends on an enormous weight of balancing information, together with
our experience and training.” The chairman of the council said that “we
are trained to question, and to assess carefully the evidence we are given.”73
The use of simple heuristics to make complex decisions is not limited to law.
Physician Clement McDonald, for example, writes that doctors often rely on a subset
of information and extrapolate based on experience to make diagnoses and treatment
decisions. He notes that the lack of scientific information available on some drugs and
diseases requires doctors to develop heuristics. Rather than ignoring the use of heuris-
tics, he calls for the medical community to formalize them:
Exposing these heuristics to critical review so that they can be clarified,
improved, and standardized may reduce practice variation, thereby making
it easier to optimize the care process. Furthermore, we know that many of
the “everyday” heuristics described by Tversky and Kahneman are dys-
functional; careful examination of medical heuristics may reveal similar
problems and provide corrective insight.74
As an example of an everyday heuristic, he discusses how doctors tend to prescribe
a new drug when an older drug in the same class would do as well. He refers to this
“heuristic” as “newer is automatically better.” However, there are many examples of
71. Brent D. Rosso, Kathryn H. Dekas, & Amy Wrzesniewski, On the
Meaning of Work: A Theoretical Integration and Review, 30
RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 91 (2010).
72. Mandeep K. Dhami, Psychological Models of Professional Decision
Making, 14 PSYCHOL SCI. 175 (2003).
73. Mandeep K. Dhami & Peter Ayton, Bailing and Jailing the Fast and
Frugal Way, 14 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 141, 163 (2001).
74. Clement J. McDonald, Medical Heuristics: The Silent Adjudicators
of Clinical Practice, 124 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 56, 57 (1996).
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new drugs that eventually were found to have additional side effects (or worse) only
after their widespread use across time. As a result, he proposes that the heuristic
should be to always use an old drug unless the patient cannot tolerate it or if specific
symptoms or other indications suggest that the old drug will not work. 
In the same way, judges can consider the “rules of thumb” they may be using to
process their cases, whether traffic, small claims, family, civil, or criminal. Are there
specific factors that cause one judge to put the defendant in custody at sentencing
while another does not? Does a defendant’s marital status have any bearing on a bail
decision? Like the English magistrates, do individual judges rely on certain primary
factors to decide cases? If so, what are they, and do their colleagues use the same
ones? One of the studies on bail decisions revealed that the magistrates sometimes
were inconsistent in their own decisions and disagreed with some of their colleagues
on the same cases.75 Taking time to reflectively identify and rely on decision heuris-
tics that are transparent and predictable across cases and judges could go a long way
to enhancing litigant perceptions of fairness.76
• Be mindful and read the dials. Practicing the principles of procedural fairness
requires focus and attention, which may be hard to come by if a judge is tired or hun-
gry, is multitasking, or is not in a mood to engage in effortful processing. Taking stock
of such distracting factors serves as a reminder that more concentration may be neces-
sary. Periodically “reading the dials” helps identify distractions and potential ways to
lessen their effects. For example, does the temperature in the courtroom need to be
adjusted or noise in the hallways reduced? Is it time for a break? Sometimes little
annoyances become irritating distractions and unwittingly raise the level of tension in
the courtroom. Sometimes the judge just wants to “push through” the remaining cases
when a break would be best for all.
Some judges and lawyers have adopted a practice of “mindfulness” to strengthen
their ability to read the dials.77 Researchers from Harvard describe the practice of
mindfulness as meditation that “encompasses focusing attention on the experience
of thoughts, emotions, and body sensations, simply observing them as they arise and
pass away.”78 Other researchers note that “mindfulness is thought to enable one to
respond to situations more reflectively (as opposed to reflexively).”79
Mindfulness practice is essentially exercise for the brain. Meditation can be done
while sitting, standing, or walking. A common meditation practice involves sitting
quietly and concentrating on the breath. Individuals try to identify when their mind
wanders from focusing on the experience of breathing; and, once they do, they return
the mind’s focus to the breath. As they practice this sequence over and over, they
75. Dhami & Ayton, supra note 73.
76. Gerd Gigerenzer, Heuristics, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW 17 (Gerd
Gigerenzer & Christoph Engel eds., 2006). 
77. See, e.g., Mindfulness in Law Web site at http://mindfulness
inlaw.com/Home.html; The Institute for Mindfulness Studies, The
Mindful Judge website at http://themindfuljudge.com/Home.html;
Amanda Enayati, Seeking Serenity: When Lawyers Go Zen, CNN
HEALTH (May 11, 2011), http://thechart.blogs.cnn.com/2011/05/
11/seeking-serenity-when-lawyers-go-zen/; and Leonard L.
Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions of
Mindfulness Mediation to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients,
7 NEGOTIATION L. REV. 1 (2002)
78. Britta K. Hölzel et al., How Does Mindfulness Meditation Work?
Proposing Mechanisms of Action from a Conceptual and Neural Per-
spective, 6 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 537, 538 (2011).
79. Scott R. Bishop et al., Mindfulness: A Proposed Operational Defini-
tion, 11 CLINICAL PSYCHOL.: SCI. & PRAC. 230, 232 (2004).
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gradually learn to recognize the thoughts and emotions that pull their attention away
and are able to regain focus more easily. Research by psychologist Amishi Jha and her
colleagues shows that the ability to focus attention is evident after just thirty min-
utes of practice a day for eight weeks.80 As with physical exercise, the longer indi-
viduals practice mindfulness meditation, the more skilled they become.81
Bob Stahl and Elisha Goldstein offer another mindfulness practice to help indi-
viduals take a quick look at the dials. They refer to it as the STOP meditation.82 The
STOP acronym reminds individuals to:
Stop what they are currently doing,
Take a deep breath and focus on the sensation of breathing,
Observe what they are thinking, feeling, and doing, and 
Proceed with new awareness.
Judges can use this quick pause throughout the day, especially when they find
themselves getting distracted, bored, or overwhelmed. The pause helps to refocus
attention and reaffirm the priority to ensure each case is given a fair process. 
In 2002, attorney Douglas Codiga expressed concern that judges and attorneys’
misconceptions about mindfulness being mystical or otherworldly, requiring a com-
mitment to Buddhism, or amounting to just another stress-reduction technique
would lessen its potential to impact the field.83 Contrary to these misconceptions, he
argued that mindfulness is compatible with legal principles of reason, analysis, and
skepticism; does not conflict with preexisting religious beliefs and requires no com-
mitment to Buddhism; and, in addition to reducing stress and improving lawyering
skills, would help legal professionals develop insights regarding their entire lives. 
Since Codiga’s article, additional research has been undertaken demonstrating the
potential for mindfulness meditation to improve psychological well-being in addi-
tion to its effectiveness in treating a range of physical and psychological disorders.84
No doubt these good findings have contributed to the adoption of mindfulness prac-
tices in a variety of settings such as medicine, education, business, the military, and,
as noted earlier, by some in the legal profession.85 And recently Supreme Court Jus-
tice Stephen Breyer revealed to CNN’s Amanda Enyati that he routinely “pauses”
twice each day: 
80. Amishi P. Jha, Jason Krompinger, & Michael J. Baime, Mindfulness
Training Modifies Subsystems of Attention, 7 COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE,
& BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 109 (2007).
81. Alberto Chiesa, Raffaella Calati, & Alessandro Serreti, Does Mind-
fulness Training Improve Cognitive Abilities? A Systematic Review of
Neuropsychological Findings, 31 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. R. 449 (2011).
82. See STOP meditation demonstrated at http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=EiuTpeu5xQc. See generally ELISHA GOLDSTEIN, THE NOW
EFFECT: HOW THIS MOMENT CAN CHANGE THE REST OF YOUR LIFE
(2012); BOB STAHL & ELISHA GOLDSTEIN, A MINDFULNESS-BASED
STRESS REDUCTION WORKBOOK (2010).
83. Douglas A. Codiga, Reflections on the Potential Growth of Mindfulness
Meditation in the Law, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 109 (2002).
84. Hölzel et al., supra note 78.
85. See, e.g., David Gelles, The Mind Business, FINANCIAL TIMES MAGA-
ZINE (Aug. 24, 2012), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/
2/d9cb7940-ebea-11e1-985a-00144feab49a.html#axzz27af4lcAI;
Luke Fortney & Molly Taylor, Meditation in Medical Practice: A
Review of the Evidence and Practice, 37 PRIMARY CARE: CLINICS
OFFICE PRAC. 81 (2010); Daniel Schneider, “Mindfulness” Helps
Soldiers Cope in Iraq, U.S. DEP’T DEFENSE (Aug. 3, 2010), available
at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=60294;
Patricia Leigh Brown, In the Classroom, a New Focus on Quieting
the Mind, NY TIMES (June 16, 2007), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/16/us/16mindful.html?ex=1183
608000&en=3d87faf9c47eb9f2&ei=5070&_r=0.
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I don’t know that what I do is meditation, or even whether it has a name. For
10 or 15 minutes twice a day I sit peacefully. I relax and think about nothing or as
little as possible. And that is what I’ve done for a couple of years. . . . And really I
started because it’s good for my health. My wife said this would be good for your
blood pressure and she was right. It really works. I read once that the practice of
law is like attempting to drink water from a fire hose. And if you are under stress,
meditation—or whatever you choose to call it—helps. Very often I find myself in
circumstances that may be considered stressful, say in oral arguments where I
have to concentrate very hard for extended periods. If I come back at lunchtime,
I sit for 15 minutes and perhaps another 15 minutes later. Doing this makes me
feel more peaceful, focused and better able to do my work.86
• Use decision aids. At first blush the idea of using a decision aid, like a checklist or
benchcard, seems so mundane.  But lessons from other professions such as medicine
and aviation demonstrate their incredible potential for improving performance. Physi-
cian Atul Gawande, for example, tells the story of how simple checklists (requiring
steps such as washing hands with soap and fully covering the patient with sterile
drapes) implemented in Michigan hospital intensive care units saved over 1,500 lives
and an estimated $175 million dollars in costs.87
Judges sometimes use checklists to decide substantive issues, but judges might
also benefit from having procedural checklists.88 In busy courtrooms with crowded
dockets, a judge can easily fail to cover an essential piece of information that a defen-
dant must be told before a plea may be voluntarily entered. Even so, this is one of
those areas in which the judge should think carefully about both procedural fairness
and crossing off all the necessary subjects on the checklist. It’s important that the
defendant actually understand the rights he or she is giving up, not just answering
“yes” to a series of questions obviously intended to get an affirmative response (“Do
you understand . . . ?). 
Other tools based on evidence-based practices, such as risk and needs assessments,
can be helpful to judges in making sentencing and probation-revocation decisions.89
Research demonstrates that standardized, objective assessment instruments enhance
decision making across a wide variety of professional decisions.90 Researchers
Stephen Gottfredson and Laura Moriarty suggest the following reasons, in part based
on reflexive processing, for the superiority of statistical methods of prediction com-
pared to intuitive methods: decision makers may not use information reliably, may
not attend to base rates, may inappropriately weight predictive items, may weight
items that are not predictive, and may be influenced by causal attributions or spuri-
ous correlations.”91
86. Enyati, supra note 77.
87. Atul Gawande, The Checklist, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 10, 2007),
available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/12/10/
071210fa_fact_gawande; see also ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST
MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT (2011).
88. For examples of substantive-law checklists, see Guthrie, Rachlin-
ski & Wistrich, supra note 22, at 40.
89. Pamela M. Casey, Roger K. Warren, & Jennifer K. Elek. Using
Offender Risk and Needs Assessment Information at Sentencing:
Guidance for Courts from a National Working Group, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (2011), available at
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Some of the Michigan doctors in Dr. Gawande’s report balked at having to follow
checklists, complaining that they were too busy, already knew what the procedures
were, or were more interested in trying out new techniques and procedures. Judges
may feel that way, too—concerned about slowing the process down to follow a
checklist or thinking they can handle the process fine without the tool. But appellate
judges see the other end of the process when they reverse decisions because simple
steps were not followed. No one benefits when a case is sent back a year or two later
because a simple step was missed.
Decision tools are just that—tools. Used properly, they can help ensure fair proce-
dures and just outcomes; used incorrectly, they can impair the process. A judge who
goes on automatic, for example, merely reading off a checklist and not giving eye
contact or listening to litigants and lawyers will not be practicing procedural fairness
even if he or she is not overturned on appeal. 
• Seek feedback and foster accountability. Judges suffer from a lack of feedback. They
seldom know the results of their decisions. Even when a judge’s decision is reviewed
by an appellate court, the lag time between making the decision and getting appellate
feedback diminishes the value of the information. Individuals benefit the most when
feedback is immediate. 
Because feedback is essential to learning and developing expertise, judges should
seek and courts should provide opportunities to obtain feedback. Judges cannot
improve decisions when they do not know what is and is not working. Does the
court have access to outcome data on, for example, pretrial release, sentencing, and
probation revocation decisions? What are the trends in the data? What cases most
often result in failure to appeal or rearrest, and what decision heuristics might be
guiding the cases?  The court could also collect information on litigant satisfaction
using a survey such as the National Center for State Courts’ CourTools Access and
Fairness Measure.92 The results of the survey would indicate whether judges’ assess-
ments of their practice of procedural fairness principles are consistent with litigants’
assessments. 
Judges also could be videotaped periodically or observed by a mentor or colleague.
A neutral observer more likely will be able to identify mistakes in reasoning or
instances where procedural fairness practices could be strengthened.93 Dr. Gawande
found that, after eight years as a surgeon, he seemed to have reached a plateau, so he
sought out one of his former teachers—since retired—to observe him and act as a
coach. The “coach” spent 20 minutes explaining what he observed that Gawande was-
n’t aware of, giving Gawande “more to consider and work on” than Gawande had
come up with on his own for several years.94 Judges might well benefit from a similar
practice. More specifically, sentencing roundtables where judges discuss hypothetical
cases also could reveal different patterns of decision making and use of heuristics. The
92. National Center for State Courts, CourTools: Measure 1, Access and
Fairness (2005), available at http://www.courtools.org/~/media/
Microsites/Files/CourTools/courtools_Trial_measure1_access_and
_fairness.ashx.
93. Brest & Krieger, supra note 10, at 635.
94. Atul Gawande, Personal Best: Top Athletes and Singers Have
Coaches. Should You?, NEW YORKER, Oct. 3, 2011, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/10/03/111003fa_fact_
gawande?currentPage=all.  
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purpose of such reviews is to analyze and reflect on the information; research shows
that the combination of reflection and feedback enhances subsequent performance.95
In addition, research shows that accountability can lead to more effortful, reflec-
tive processing of information. Researcher Eileen Braman explains:
Put another way, accountability tends to heighten accuracy motivations.
When we know others are watching, we want to “get things right” and we
also strive to use appropriate decision criteria to avoid criticisms that may
be raised down the line.96
There are exceptions to the positive influence of accountability on performance such
as when decision makers conform their decisions to the known views of those review-
ing their decisions or when decision makers lack the knowledge to make specific deci-
sions.97 Generally, however, accountability attenuates bias in decision making. 
One suggestion for holding judges accountable is to require that they provide an
explanation for their decision, preferably in writing. Guthrie and his colleagues argue
that “the discipline of opinion writing might enable well-meaning judges to over-
come their intuitive, impressionistic reactions.”98 Research also shows that individu-
als who were required to justify each step in a decision process performed better.99
To the extent that judges ask themselves “why” at each point in their decision
process and consider alternatives, their decisions will be the result of more effortful
and deliberate processing.  And to the extent that they are willing to engage in
obtaining and using feedback from others, as discussed above, they will enhance a
culture of accountability.
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